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Abstract—This paper proposes a practical payment protocol with scalable anonymity for Internet purchases, and analyzes its role-
based access control (RBAC). The protocol uses electronic cash for payment transactions. It is an offline payment scheme that can
prevent a consumer from spending a coin more than once. Consumers can improve anonymity if they are worried about disclosure of
their identities to banks. An agent provides high anonymity through the issue of a certification. The agent certifies reencrypted data
after verifying the validity of the content from consumers, but with no private information of the consumers required. With this new
method, each consumer can get the required anonymity level, depending on the available time, computation, and cost. We use RBAC
to manage the new payment scheme and improve its integrity. With RBAC, each user may be assigned one or more roles, and each
role can be assigned one or more privileges that are permitted to users in that role. To reduce conflicts of different roles and decrease
complexities of administration, duty separation constraints, role hierarchies, and scenarios of end-users are analyzed.
Index Terms—Electronic-cash, anonymity, integrity, trace ability, hash function.
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1 INTRODUCTION
RECENT advances in the Internet and WWW have enabledrapid development in e-commerce. More and more
businesses have begun to develop or adopt e-commerce
systems to support their selling/business activities. While
this brings convenience for both consumers and vendors,
many consumers have concerns about security and their
private information when purchasing over the Internet,
especially with electronic payment or e-cash payment.
Consumers often prefer to have some degree of anonymity
when shopping over the Internet. There are a number of
proposals for electronic cash systems [1], [2], [3]. Probably,
it is accurate to say that most of them lack flexibility in
anonymity. Chaum [1], for example, first proposed an
online payment system that guarantees receiving valid
coins. This system provides some anonymity against a
collaboration between shops and banks. However, con-
sumers have no flexible anonymity and banks have to keep
a very large database for consumers and coins.
The systems mentioned above are online payment
systems. They need sophisticated cryptographic functions
for each coin, and require additional computational re-
sources for banks to validate purchases. Forcing banks to be
online at payment is a very strict requirement. Online
payment systems protect merchants and banks against
customer fraud since every payment needs to be approved
by the customer’s banks. This increases the computation
cost, proportional to the size of the database of spent coins. If
a large number of people start using a payment system, the
size of this database could become very large and
unmanageable. Keeping a database of all the coins ever
spent in the system is not a scalable solution. Digicash [4]
plans to use multiple banks, each minting and managing
their own currency, with interbank clearing to handle the
problems of scalability. It seems likely that the host bank
machine has an internal scalable structure so that it can be set
up not only for a 10,000 consumer bank, but also for a
1,000,000 consumer bank. Under the current circumstances,
the task of maintaining and querying a database of spent
coins is probably beyond today’s state-of-the-art database
systems [5].
In an offline protocol, merchants verify payments using
cryptographic techniques, and commit payments to pay-
ments authority later, in an offline batch process. Offline
payment systems were designed to lower the cost of
transactions due to the delay in verifying batch processes.
However, they suffer from the potential of double spend-
ing, whereby the electronic currency might be duplicated
and spent repeatedly.
The first offline anonymous electronic cash was intro-
duced by Chaum et al. [24]. The security of their scheme
relied on some restricted assumptions, such as requiring a
function which is similar to random oracle, and has to map
onto a special range. There is also no formal proof
attempted. Although hardly practical, their system demon-
strated how offline e-cash can be constructed and laid the
foundation for more secure and efficient schemes. In 1995,
Chan et al. [7] presented a provable secure offline e-cash
scheme that relied only on the security of RSA [8]. This
scheme extended the work of Franklin and Yung [9] who
aimed to achieve provable security without the use of
general computation protocols. The anonymity of consu-
mers is based on the security of RSA and it cannot be
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changed dynamically after the system is established.
NetCents [10] proposed a lightweight, flexible, and secure
protocol for micro payments of electronic commerce over
the Internet. This protocol is designed only to support
purchases ranging in value from a fraction of a penny and
up. In 2000, Pointcheval [11] presented a payment scheme
in which the consumer’s identity can be found any time by
a certification authority. So, the privacy of a consumer
cannot be protected.
Furthermore, the issue of privilege management across
multiple domains poses a number of additional challenges.
First, there is a need to represent different types of
privileges for different services in a purchase process. Our
payment scheme is able to support a range of access
policies, including role-based access control (RBAC). RBAC
has gained much popularity in access control, though the
idea of partitioning privileges in terms of specific job
functions and roles has been well known for several
decades. Second, there is a need to verify the correctness
and the validity of the privileges at the time of access to a
service. The security management model should be flexible
enough to specify a range of privileges and to evaluate them
to make appropriate decisions in an efficient manner.
To demonstrate the importance of management policies,
consider the unconstrained actions of Nicholas Leeson, who
led to the bankruptcy of England’s oldest investment firm
in 1995 [12]. Leeson was granted the right to do both the
financial derivatives trading operation and back office
functions where trades were settled. This is a mix of roles
that can be dangerous. In any firm serious about preventing
fraud in its operations, this arrangement is conflicting.
Management at Barings PLC should never have had the
same person making and settling trades. Such a conflict of
interest policy can be specified centrally by management,
and enforced effectively using RBAC technology.
Role-based access control (RBAC) has been widely used
in database system management and operating system
products [13], [14], [15]. Many RBAC practical applications
have been implemented [16], [17], [18] because RBAC has
many advantages such as reducing administration cost and
complexity. Another use of RBAC is to support integrity.
Integrity is a requirement that data and processes be
modified only in authorized ways by authorized users.
Within a role-based system, the principal concern is
protecting the integrity of information: who can perform
what acts on what information. However, there has been
little research done on the usage of RBAC in payment
scheme management [19].
As mentioned above, online e-cash payments need more
computing resources. Most of the previously designed
offline schemes are only for micro payments. They rely on
the heuristic proofs of security and, therefore, do not
formally prevent fraud and counterfeit money. Under these
conditions, most online and offline payment schemes do not
provide efficient anonymity for consumers. Hence, a new
payment scheme for the purchases over the Internet with
the following properties are very useful and important:
1. Offline: It spends less computational resources and
reduces network communication.
2. Flexible anonymity: It can provide high-level anon-
ymity for some consumers with high security
requirements.
3. Untrace ability: No one can trace consumers from
cash. However, the identity of a consumer can be
found if he/she uses a coin twice.
4. RBAC management: It can decrease the complexities
of a system and improve system security such as
integrity.
In this paper, we analyze the electronic-payment model
first, then propose a new offline electronic cash scheme in
which the anonymity of consumers is scalable. Consumers
can get the required anonymity without showing their
identities to any third party. Furthermore, to reduce
administration cost and complexity and to improve the
security of management, we analyze how to use RBAC to
manage the new payment scheme.
The paper is organized as follows: In the first two
sections, some basic definitions and simple examples are
reviewed. The payment model and the anonymity provider
agent are described in Section 3. The design of a new offline
electronic cash scheme and its security analysis, including a
logical proof for security, are detailed in Section 4. The RBAC
management of the new scheme such as the relationships of
roles and end-user use scenarios is presented in Section 5.
An example of the new e-cash scheme and how to use it for
Internet purchases are given in Section 6. Conclusions are
included in Section 7.
2 SOME BASIC DEFINITIONS
2.1 Hash Functions
HðxÞ is a hash function. For a given value W , it is
computationally hard to find an x such that HðxÞ ¼W ,
i.e., collisions are hard to find, where x might be a vector.
Hash function is a major building block for several
cryptographic protocols, including pseudorandom genera-
tors [20], digital signatures [21], andmessage authentication.
2.2 DLA and ElGamal Encryption System
Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DLA) is an assumption
that the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be
difficult.
The discrete logarithm problem is as follows: Given an
element g in a group G of order q, and another element y of
G, find x, where 0 < x < q  1, such that y is the result of
multiplying g with itself x times, i.e., y ¼ gx. In some
groups, there exist elements that can generate all the
elements of G by exponentiation (i.e., applying the group
operation repeatedly) with all the integers from 0 to q  1.
When this occurs, the element is called a generator and the
group is called cyclic. Rivest [22] has analyzed the expected
time to solve the discrete logarithm problem both in terms
of computing power and cost and shown that it is
computationally hard to get y from x.
For this reason, it has been used for the basis of several
public-key cryptosystems, including the famous ElGamal
encryption system. The ElGamal encryption system [23] is a
public key encryption scheme which provides semantic
security. Let us briefly recall it.
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Table 1 indicates that the message m can be obtained
only by the person who has the secret key sk.
2.3 Undeniable Signature Scheme and Schnorr
Signature Scheme
The undeniable signature scheme, devised by Chaum and
Antwerpen [6], is a non-self-authenticating signature
scheme, where signatures can only be verified with the
signer’s consent. However, if a signature is only verifiable
with the aid of a signer, a dishonest signer may refuse to
authenticate a genuine document. Undeniable signatures
solve this problem by adding a new component, called the
disavowal protocol, in addition to the normal components
of signature and verification.
An undeniable proof scheme consists of the following
algorithms:
1. The key generation algorithm K which outputs
random pairs of secret and public keys ðsk; pkÞ.
2. The proof algorithm P ðsk;mÞ which inputs a
message m, returns an “undeniable signature” S
on m. However, this proof “S” does not convince
anybody by itself. To be convinced of the validity of
the pair ðm;SÞ, relative to the public key pk, one has
to interact with the owner of the secret key sk.
3. The confirmation process confirms ðsk; pk;m; SÞ,
which is an interactive protocol between the signer
and the verifier, where the signer tries to convince of
the validity of the pair ðm;SÞ.
4. The disavowal process is an interactive protocol
between the signer and the verifier, where the signer
can prove that a forged signature really is a forgery.
We simply recall the following example shown in Table 2
that is an undeniable signature scheme [25]. The disavowal
process is detailed below.
The signer is not able to deny the signature S ¼ ðe; yÞ
because the signature can be produced by the owner of the
secret key sk only. The signature S ¼ ðe; yÞ is confirmed
only if x ¼ gypkeðmod pÞ and checks e ¼ hðx;mÞ with the
public key pk. In the disavowal process, the verifier chooses
a random number R1 and sends to the signer. The latter
picks a random r1, computes hðx1Þ; y1 ¼ r1 þ SR1, where
x1 ¼ gr1 , sends hðx1Þ and y1 to the verifier, the verifier
computes x ¼ gy1pkR1 and checks if hðx1Þ ¼ hðxÞ.
2.4 Role-Based Access Control
RBAC is described in terms of individual users being
associated with roles as well as roles being associated with
permissions (each permission is a pair of objects and
operations). As such, a role is used to associate with users
and permissions. A user in this model is a human being. A
role is a job function or job title within the organization
associated with the authority and responsibility.
Permission is an approval of a particular operation to
be performed on one or more objects. The relationship
between roles and permissions is shown in Fig. 1, arrows
indicate a many-to-many relationship (i.e., a permission
can be associated with one or more roles and a role can
be associated with one or more permissions). The RBAC
security model has two components: MC0 and MC1.
Model component MC0, called the RBAC authorization
database model, defines the RBAC security properties for
authorization of static roles. Static properties of an RBAC
authorization database include role hierarchy, inheritance,
cardinality, and static separation of duty. MC1, called the
RBAC activation model, defines the RBAC security
properties for dynamic activation of roles. Dynamic
properties include role activation, permission execution,
dynamic separation of duties, and object access. A session
is a mapping of one user to possible roles. In other
words, a user establishes a session during which the user
activates some subset of roles that he/she is a member of.
In particular, the RBAC model supports the specification
in Table 3.
We note that properties b and c have to be decided when
a system is designed. This is because the relationship of
different roles may be in conflict, compromising the
integrity of the system. Properties b and c can decrease
the complexities of management and reduce the conflicts of
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TABLE 1
ElGamal Encryptiom Scheme
TABLE 2
Schnorr Signature Scheme
Fig. 1. RBAC relationship.
different roles. Therefore, this paper focuses on relation-
ships of roles such as Role hierarchies, SSD, and DSD.
3 NEW PAYMENT MODEL
We show the basic payment model and then discuss the
new payment model in this section.
3.1 Basic Payment Model
Electronic cash has sparked wide interest among crypto-
graphers ([22], [26], [27], etc.). In its simplest form, an e-cash
system consists of three parts (a bank, a consumer, and a
shop) and three main procedures, as shown in Fig. 2
(withdrawal, payment, and deposit). In a coin’s life-cycle,
the consumer first performs an account establishment
protocol to open an account with the bank.
The consumer and the shop maintain an account with
the bank, while
1. The consumer withdraws electronic coins from his
account, by performing a withdrawal protocol with
the bank over an authenticated channel.
2. The consumer spends a coin by participating in a
payment protocol with a shop over an anonymous
channel.
3. The shop performs a deposit protocol with the bank,
to deposit the consumer’s coin into his account.
The system is offline if the shop does not communicate
with the bank during payment. It is untraceable if there is
no p.p.t. TM (probabilistic polynomial-time Turing Ma-
chine) that can identify a coin’s origin even if one has all
the information of withdrawal, payment, and deposit
transactions. It is anonymous if the bank, in collaboration
with the shop, cannot trace the coin to the consumer.
However, in the absence of tamperproof hardware,
electronic coins can be copied and spent multiple times
by the consumer. This has been traditionally referred to
as double-spending. In an online e-cash system, double-
spending is prevented by having banks check if a coin
has been deposited before. In an offline e-cash system,
however, this solution is not possible; instead, as
proposed by Chaum et al. [24], the system guarantees
that, if a coin is double-spent, the consumer’s identity is
revealed with overwhelming probability.
There are also three additional processes, such as the
bank setup, the shop setup, and the consumer setup
(account opening). They describe the system initialization,
namely, creation and posting of public keys and opening of
bank accounts. Although they are certainly part of a
complete system, these are often omitted as their function-
alities can be easily inferred from the description of the
three main procedures. For clarity, we only describe the
bank setup and the consumer setup for the new scheme in
the next section because the shop setup is similar to the
consumer setup.
Besides the basic participants, a third party, the named
Anonymity Provider (AP) agent, is involved in the scheme.
The AP agent helps the consumer to get the required
anonymity, but is not involved in the purchase process. The
new model is shown in Fig. 3. The AP agent gives a
certificate to the consumer when he/she needs a high level
of anonymity.
3.2 Anonymity Provider Agent
Here, we explain what an AP agent is. Assume a consumer
owns a valid coin c ¼ ’ðpkB; pku; yÞwith its certificate Certc,
where ’ðpkB; pku; yÞ is a function of the public keys of the
bank, the consumer, and a variable y, i.e., ðpkB; pku; yÞ. The
certificate Certc guarantees correct withdrawal from a bank,
whether a coin is valid or not depends on its certificate.
Certc is a coin certificate and does not contain any
information about a customer. After the following processes
with the AP agent, the consumer owns a new valid coin
c0 ¼ ’ðpkB; pku; yþ vÞ with its certificate Certc0 , where v is a
variable. Please note that a certificate can be a signature of a
issuer:
fV alue : IssuerName : IssuerSerial : IssuerNumber
: Timeg:
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TABLE 3
Specification of RBAC
Fig. 2. Basic processes of an electronic cash system.
Fig. 3. New electronic cash model.
Therefore, certificates made by a bank and an AP agent are
different and do not include a customer’s identity.
1. The consumer reencrypts the coin c into
c0 ¼ ’ðpkB; pku; yþ vÞ:
2. The consumer provides an undeniable signature S,
and the equivalence between c and c0. This equiva-
lence is guaranteed by the variable v.
3. The consumer confirms the validity of this signature
S to the AP agent.
4. The AP agent certifies the new coin c0 and sends
Certc0 to the consumer.
Indeed, after Steps 2 and 3, the AP is convinced that the
conversion has been performed by the owner of the coin c;
c0 is equivalent to c. The owner of c is not able to deny S (the
relation between c and c0). The AP agent should be an
electronic notarized participant in the system. It does not
need to know any private information about consumers; it
only verifies the information of consumers.
3.3 Proof of Ownership of a Coin
This section shows how consumers prove the ownership of
a coin. Let us assume that Y is the public key of a bank, xu is
a secret key of a consumer, and I ¼ gxu is the identity of a
consumer. Hðx; yÞ is a hash function. A coin is the
encryption of I: c ¼ ða ¼ gr; b ¼ Y rIsÞ, which is afterward
certified by the bank, where r; s are random numbers. With
the certificate of the bank, one knows that the encryption is
valid. Therefore, in order to prove his ownership, the
consumer has just to convince of his knowledge of ðxu; r; sÞ
such that b ¼ Y rIs. This can be expressed as in Table 4.
Then, a scrambled coin is gotten by multiplying both
parts of the old one by the respective bases, g and Y , both to
the same random exponent :
c0 ¼ ða0 ¼ ga; b0 ¼ Y bÞ ¼ ðgrþ; Y rþIsÞ:
Then, if the owner of the old coin has certified the message
m0 ¼ h, the equivalence of both coins can be proven with
the proof of equivalence of three discrete logarithms:
loghm
0 ¼ loggða0=aÞ ¼ logY ðb0=bÞ;
where h is a public variable.
4 ANONYMITY SCALABLE PAYMENT SCHEME
In this section, we propose an anonymity self-scalable
payment scheme. The new payment scheme has two main
features. The first is that a consumer can have a high level of
anonymity himself and the second is that the identity of a
consumer cannot be traced unless the consumer spends the
same coin twice.
Our scheme includes two basic processes in system
initialization (bank setup and consumer setup) and three
main protocols: a new withdrawal protocol with which a
consumer withdraws electronic coins from a bank while his
account is debited, a new payment protocol with which a
consumer pays the coin to a shop, and a new deposit
protocol with which the shop deposits the coin to the bank
and has his account credited. If a consumer wants to get a
high level of anonymity after getting a coin from the bank
(withdrawal), he/she can contact the AP agent.
4.1 System Initialization
The bank setup and the consumer setup are described as
follows, and the details of the shop setup are omitted
(because the shop setup is similar to the consumer setup).
4.1.1 Bank Setup (Performed Once by the Bank)
Primes p and q are chosen such that jp 1j ¼  þ k, for a
specified constant , and p ¼ q þ 1, for a specified small
integer . Then, a unique subgroup Gq of prime order q of
the multiplicative group Zp and generator g of Gq are
defined. Secret key xB 2R Zq for a denomination is created,
where a 2R A means that the element a is selected
randomly from the set A with uniform distribution. Hash
function H from a family of collision intractable hash
functions is also defined. The bank publishes p; q; g;H, and
its public key Y ¼ gxBðmod pÞ.
The secret key xB is safe under the DLA. The hash
function is used in payment transactions.
4.1.2 Consumer Setup (Performed for Each Consumer)
The bank associates the consumer with I ¼ gxuðmod pÞ,
where xu 2 Gq is the secret key of the consumer and is
generated by the consumer.
After the consumer’s account and the shop’s account are
opened, the new payment scheme can be described.
4.2 New Offline Payment Scheme
We now describe the new anonymity scalable electronic
cash scheme, which includes withdrawal, payment, and
deposit.
4.2.1 Withdrawal (Consumers Withdraw Coins
from the Bank)
Usually, an anonymous coin is a certified message which
embeds the public key of a consumer. In our scheme, the
message is an encryption of this consumer’s public key,
using the public key Y of the bank.
Instead of using intricate zero-knowledge proofs to
convince the bank of the validity of the encryption, the
consumer shows some information to the bank, including a
signature. So, the bank certifies the encryption with full
confidence.
The consumer I ¼ gxu constructs a coin c ¼ ða ¼ gr; b ¼
Y rIsÞ using the public key Y of the bank, where s is a secret
key of the coin which is kept by the consumer and r is a
random number in Zq. Using the private key xu, the
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TABLE 4
Proof of Validity of a Coin c ¼ Y rIs
consumer signs a Schnorr signature S on the message of c
together with the date, etc. He/she sends ðc; SÞ to the bank
together with r; I. Then, the bank can check the correct
encryption. With the signature of the coin and the date, only
the legitimate consumer could have done it. After having
modified the consumer’s account, the bank sends back a
certificate Certc. The consumer needs to remember
ðr; s; CertcÞ only.
4.2.2 Anonymity Scalability (Performed between
Consumers and the AP Agent)
The consumer can use the coin now without a high level of
anonymity since the bank can easily trace any transaction
performed through the coin. This is because some informa-
tion of the consumer such as I; Certc has been known by the
bank. To solve this problem, an AP agent is established to
help the consumer to achieve a high level of anonymity: The
consumer can derive a new encryption of his identity in an
indistinguishable way. However, the consumer needs a
new certificate for a new issued cipher text. The AP agent
can provide this new certificate. Before certifying, the
consumer requires both the previous coin ðc; CertcÞ and
the proof of equivalence between the two cipher texts.
Details are described below.
The consumer contacts the AP agent if he/she needs to
get a high level of anonymity. The consumer chooses a
random  and reencrypts the coin:
c0 ¼ ða0 ¼ ga; b0 ¼ Y bÞ:
1. The consumer generates a Schnorr signature S on
m ¼ h using the secret key xu, as shown in
Section 2.3. Because of S, the consumer is not able
to deny his knowledge of  later. Furthermore,
nobody can impersonate the consumer at this step
since the discrete logarithm xu of I is required to
produce a valid signature. So, there is no existential
forgery.
2. The consumer also provides a designated verifier
proof of equality of discrete logarithms
loghm ¼ loggða0=aÞ ¼ logY ðb0=bÞ: ð1Þ
3. The consumer finally sends c; c0; S;m to the AP
agent.
4. The AP agent checks the certificate Certc on c, the
validity of the signature S on the message m, then
certifies c0, and sends back a certificate Certc0 to the
consumer.
After these processes, the consumer gets a new certified
coin c0 ¼ ða0 ¼ ga; b0 ¼ Y bÞ and a new certification Certc0 ,
which is now strongly anonymous from the point of view of
the bank. The AP agent has to keep ðc; c0;m; SÞ to be able to
prove the link between c and c0, with the help of the
consumer. If the number of consumers gets large, databases
for the AP agent and banks is huge, data back up is
required. We may backup data once a month or once every
two weeks to support the system.
Following the process, the AP agent can also give many
smaller new coins for an old one since the amount of a new
one can be embedded in the certificate Certc0 .
4.2.3 Payment (Performed between the Consumer and
the Shop over an Anonymous Channel)
When a consumer possesses a coin, he/she can simply
spend it at shops by proving knowledge of the secret key
ðxu; sÞ associated with the coin c or c0. This proof is a
signature S ¼ ðe; u; v; t1Þ of the new certificate Certc0 ,
purchase, date, etc., with the secret key ðxu; sÞ associating
the coin to the receiver (which is later forwarded to the
bank).
4.2.4 Deposit (The Receiver Deposits a Coin to a Bank)
Since the system is offline, the shop sends the payment
transcript to the bank later. The transcript consists of the
coin c or c0 (if the consumer applied a high level of
anonymity), the signature, and the date/time of the
transaction. The bank verifies the correctness of payment
and credits the coin into the shop’s account.
The receiver (shop) deposits the coin into its bank
account with a transcript of the payment. If the consumer
uses the same coin c twice, then the consumer is traced: Two
different receivers send the same coin c to the bank. The
bank can easily search its records to ensure that c has not
been used before. If the consumer uses c twice, then the
bank has two different signatures. Thus, the bank can
isolate the consumer and trace the payment to the
consumer’s account I.
4.3 Security Analysis
Based on the point of view with electronic cash system, an
offline e-cash scheme is secure [9] if the following
requirements are satisfied:
1. Unreusable: If any consumer uses the same coin
twice, the identity of the consumer can be computed.
2. Untraceable: With n withdrawal processes, no p.p.t.
(probabilistic polynomial time) Turing Machine can
compute ðnþ 1Þth distinct and valid coin.
3. Unforgeable: With any number of the customer’s
withdrawal, payment, and deposit protocols, no
p.p.t. Turing Machine can compute a single valid
coin.
4. Unexpandable: With any number of the customer’s
valid withdrawal, payment, and deposit protocols,
no p.p.t. Turing Machine can compute a legal
consumer’s identity.
The security in the e-cash scheme is based on the
hardness of Discrete Logarithms [28] and hash functions.
The system preserves the above four requirements.
4.3.1 Unreusable
When a consumer spends a coin, he/she hands over the coin,
together with a signature S ¼ ðe; u; v; t1Þ, to a shop. If the
consumer uses a coin twice, then we have two signatures
S1 ¼ ðe1; u1; v1; t11Þ and S2 ¼ ðe2; u2; v2; t12Þ, where
u1 ¼ k1  re1ðmod qÞ; v1 ¼ s xue1ðmod qÞ:
u2 ¼ k2  re2ðmod qÞ; v2 ¼ s xue2ðmod qÞ:
Then, ðv2  v1Þ=ðe1  e2Þ ¼ xu; this is the secret key of the
consumer I. So, a coin in the new scheme cannot be reused.
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4.3.2 Untraceable
When a consumer constructs a coin, he/she uses the secret
keys xu and s, both of which are not shown to any other
parts in the purchase process. So, no one can trace the
consumer and the coin.
4.3.3 Unforgeable
We first discuss whether the bank and the AP agent can
forge a valid coin or not. To produce a valid coin, the first
requirement is making a encryption c ¼ ða ¼ gr; b ¼ Y rIsÞ
of I. The second requirement is using the secret key xu of
the consumer to sign a Schnorr signature of c together with
the current time. The bank can do the first step, but cannot
do the second step since it does not know the secret key xu.
This means the bank cannot forge a valid coin. Similarly, the
AP agent cannot forge a valid coin either. It should be noted
that, even though both the bank and the AP agent know a
valid coin, they still could not use it. This is because there is
a signature in the payment process which can only be done
by the consumer.
As already seen, the secret key xu of a consumer is
never revealed, only used in some signatures. A consumer
is therefore protected against any impersonation, even
from collusion of the bank, the AP agent, and the shop.
Only the consumer can construct a valid coin since there
is an undeniable signature embedded in the coin. To
prevent the bank from framing the consumer as a multiple
spender in the scheme, we use digital signature Is for s
which is known only by the consumer. Then, the system is
unforgeable.
4.3.4 Unexpandable
For a legal consumer and a valid coin, the secret key xu and
the random number s are never shown to others at any
time. Furthermore, the random number s is changed for
different coins. With nwithdrawal proceedings, the random
number s is changed n times. Then, no one can compute the
ðnþ 1Þth distinct and valid coin even if they see n procedure
withdrawals.
The AP cannot cheat shops and banks. For example, AP
knows c; c0; S;m from a consumer but not the secret key
ðxu; sÞ. In the payment process, a signature is needed when
the coin c or c0 is used. The secret key ðxu; sÞ is used to
produce the undeniable signature. It means that the AP
cannot use the old coin c to the new coin c0 and, thus, the AP
cannot cheat shops.
4.4 Logical Proof for Security
We have demonstrated that the e-cash system satisfies
secure requirements. This section examines the system
issues and use stages using logical proof [29]. Logical proof
allows analysis of trust between principals involved in
authentication. The e-cash approach is about who has rights
to access and not about authentication, hence the analysis is
different from analysis of authentication protocols. The goal
is not to prove an identity of principals but to prove that a
user has been granted privilege to use a coin. The use of
logical proof requires the transformation of the e-cash
approach into an idealized protocol and then refinement
until the required trust is obtained. The idealized protocol
associated to a coin for logical proof is as below:
. M1: Bank! Consumer : I.
. M2: Consumer! Bank : ðc; S1; r; IÞ.
. M3: Bank! Consumer : Certc.
. M4*: Consumer! AP : ðc; c0; S2;mÞ.
. M5: AP ! Consumer : Certc0 .
. M6: Consumer! Shop : S3 ¼ ðe; u; v; tlÞ.
We have the following assumptions with PKI technol-
ogy, where KBC;KAC , and KSC means shared keys between
Bank and Consumer, AP agent and Consumer, and
Consumer and Shop, respectively.
. A1: Bank ! Consumer: Bank  !KBC Consumer (A1 is
used in M3).
. A2: AP agent believes: AP agent  !KAC Consumer.
. A3: Consumer believes Certc and Certc0 are fresh.
. A4: Consumer believes: Consumer  !KSC Shop.
. A5: Bank believes c and Sl are fresh.
. A6: AP agent believes c0 and S2 are fresh.
. A7: Shop believes S3 is fresh.
To verify the approach, we need to reach the following
states:
. P1: Bank believes Consumer believes ðc; S1; r; IÞ.
. P2: AP agent believes Consumer believes
ðc; c0; S2;mÞ:
. P3: Consumer believes Certc and Certc0 .
. P4: Shop believes Consumer believes S3 ¼ ðe; u; v; tlÞ.
P1; P2; P3 relate to the e-cash creation process of the
system and the other one relates to payment processes. We
prove these states as below.
Proof. After M1 and M2:
. R1: Bank sees ðc; S1; r; IÞ.
Since S1 is an undeniable signature of the
Consumer, from R1, and the message meaning
rule [29].
. R2: Bank believes the Consumer once said
ðc; S1; r; IÞ.
Since Bank believes c, Sl are fresh (A5) and
using the nonce verification rule [29].
. R3: Bank believes Consumer believes ðc; S1; r; IÞ.
(P1) has been proven.
After M4,
. R4: AP agent sees ðc; c0; S2;mÞ.
Since S2 is a Schnorr signature of Consumer,
from R4 and A2 and the message meaning rule.
. R5: AP agent believes Consumer once said
ðc; c0; S2;mÞ.
Since AP agent believes c0, S2 are fresh (A6)
and using the nonce verification rule.
. R6: AP agent believes Consumer believes
ðc; c0; S2;mÞ.
(P2) has been proven.
After M3 and M5,
. R7: Consumer sees Certc and Certc0 , from R7 and
A1, A2, and the message meaning rule.
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. R8: Consumer believes Bank and AP agent once
said Certc and Certc0 .
Since Consumer believes, Certc and Certc0 are
fresh. Using M3 and the nonce verification rule.
. R9: Consumer believes Bank and AP agent
believe Certc and Certc0 .
From M3;M5,
. R10: Consumer believes Bank and AP agent
control Certc and Certc0 .
From R9, R10, and the jurisdiction rule [29],
. R11: Consumer believes Certc and Certc0 .
P3 has been proven.
After M6, Shop sees S3. From A4 and the message
meaning rule.
. R12: Shop believes Consumer said S3, using the
nonce verification rule and A7.
. R13: Shop believes Consumer believes S3.
P4 has been proven. tu
5 RBAC MANAGEMENT
As we mentioned before, this paper focuses on the
relationships of roles such as Role hierarchies, SSD, and
DSD. In this section, we analyze RBAC management for the
new system, which includes two parts duty separation
constraints and the scenario of end-users.
5.1 Duty Separation Constraints
With RBAC, users cannot associate with permissions
directly. Permissions must be authorized for roles and roles
must be authorized for users. In RBAC administration, two
different types of associations must be managed, i.e.,
associations between users and roles and associations
between roles and permissions. When a user’s job position
changes, only the user/role associations change. If the job
position is represented by a single role, then, when a user’s
job position changes, only two user/role associations need
to be changed: the removal of the association between the
user and the user’s current role and the addition of an
association between the user and the user’s new role.
Both SSD and DSD relations must be included in the
implementation. Once implemented, they may be config-
ured for the specific application policy and may be altered
at any time during the operational life of the system. SSD
relations are enforced at administration time. DSD relations
are enforced during runtime.
Now, we consider the RBAC management of the new
payment scheme. There are four major roles in the system,
the AP agent, the consumer, the bank, and the shop. The AP
agent, the bank, and the shop would be companies
comprised of many participants. We do not discuss the
relationships of all the participants in these companies since
they are beyond the scope of this paper. We only consider
duty separation constraints. In Fig. 4, for example, since all
staff in the AP agent, the bank, and the shop are employees,
their corresponding roles inherit the employee role. It is
similar to the relationship of the consumer and the visitor.
The roles AP agent, the shop, and the bank have a DSD
relationship with the role consumer. This indicates that an
individual consumer cannot act the roles of the AP agent,
the shop, or the bank simultaneously. The staff in these
three companies have to first log out if they want to register
as consumers. For example, a consumer who is a staff
member of the AP agent can ask the AP agent to help him to
get high anonymity. But, as a consumer, since the shop and
the bank need to check the new coin’s certificate Certc0 and
signature, he/she cannot give herself/himself a new
certificate Certc0 of a coin when he/she works for the AP
agent. Another staff member of the AP agent can help this
person.
The AP agent has an SSD relationship with the bank.
This is because the duty of the AP agent is to help a
consumer to get high anonymity. The bank knows the old
coin c ¼ ðgr; Y rIsÞ and its certificate Certc. The AP agent
sends the new certificate Certc0 of the new coin c
0 ¼
ðgrþ; Y rþIsÞ to the consumer. The bank knows the new
certificate Certc0 when the AP agent and the bank are
authorized by a staff member common in both. If so, the
consumer cannot have the required anonymity of coin. The
shop also has an SSD relationship with the bank since the
bank verifies the payment as well as depositing the coin to
the shop’s account. The SSD relationship is also a conflict of
interest relationship like the DSD relationship, but much
stronger. If two roles have an SSD relationship, then they
may not even be authorized to the same individual. Thus,
these three roles may never be authorized to the same
individual.
After analyzing duty separation constraints, we see what
a user needs to do when using the system on the Internet.
5.2 Scenarios of End-Users
End-users need to establish a session before accessing the
AP agent, bank, or shop. In establishing the session, end-
users choose a current active role set (ARS). The ARS
determines what activities the users can perform. An ARS
remains active until the users establish a new one. When a
user is assigned roles which have DSD relationships, the
session manager enables users to choose the subset of their
assigned role set that they wish to have in their ARS. The
user is presented with a list of items in the subset which do
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Fig. 4. The relationships of the roles in the new scheme.
not violate any DSD relationships and asked to choose. The
subset in the list, taken from the set of all possible assigned
roles, contains the largest subset, which does not violate any
DSD relationships. Once the choice is made, the session is
established with all authorized roles (i.e., assigned roles
along with all roles which the assigned roles inherit) being
placed in the ARS. The ARS automatically establishes all
authorized roles if there are no DSD relationships among
the roles assigned to the user.
For example, in Fig. 5, a user is assigned the consumer’s
role, the ARS is {Consumer} since the role of a consumer has
a DSD relationship with the AP agent, the shop, and the
bank. The user can perform a consumer’s activities only. If a
user is assigned a manager in the AP agent, the set of ARS is
{Manager, Operator, Quality controller}, as shown in Fig. 6.
This means the user can perform as a manager, an operator,
and a Quality controller. In the AP agent, the manager
inherits the operator and the quality controller. However,
the ARS of the Operator in the ARS at the AP agent is
{Operator} since the operator has a DSD relationship with
the quality controller. The ARS of the manager in the bank
is {Manager, Account_rep, Auditor, Teller} because the
Manager inherits the Account_rep (account representative),
the Auditor, and the Teller. The manager can act as a
manager and an account representative, an auditor, and a
teller. The details are in Table 5.
6 AN EXAMPLE AND IMPLEMENTATIONS
In this section, we give a simple example and analyze two
different purchase procedures. We show how to use the
new e-cash for Internet purchases and how to get some
smaller coins from the AP agent. This demonstrates the
efficiency of the payment protocol.
6.1 An Example
This example shows the main steps in the e-cash scheme.
We omit the details of two undeniable signatures in
withdrawal and the scalable anonymity process because
they are only used for verifying the user. In the following
example, the module 47 is used.
6.1.1 Bank Setup
Suppose ðp; q; ; kÞ ¼ ð47; 23; 2; 4Þ, then Gq ¼ f0; 1; 2; . . . ; 22g
is a subgroupoforder 23. g ¼ 3 is agenerator ofGq. Thebank’s
secret key xB ¼ 4 and hash function Hðx; yÞ ¼ 3x  5y. The
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Fig. 5. An end user’s scenario.
Fig. 6. Role relationships.
TABLE 5
The Scenario of End-Users
bank publishes Hðx; yÞ and fp; q; gg ¼ f47; 23; 3g. The public
key of the bank is Y ¼ gxB ¼ 34 ðmodule47Þ.
6.1.2 User Setup
We assume the secret of a user is xu ¼ 7 and the user sends
I ¼ gxu ¼ 25 ðmodule47Þ to the bank. After checking some
identifications, like social security card or driver’s licence,
the bank authorizes the user (consumer) with I.
After the bank setup and the user setup, the user can
purchase.
6.1.3 Withdrawal
The user chooses ðr; sÞ ¼ ð2; 3Þ and computes
c ¼ ðgr; Y rIsÞ ¼ ð9; 24Þ ðmodule47Þ;
then signs a Schnorr signature S for the message
m ¼ ðc; currenttimeÞ. The user sends c ¼ ð9; 24Þ and S to
the bank; the latter sends back a certificate Certc.
The user contacts the AP agent if he/she needs a high
level of anonymity or uses the coin in a shop directly (see
Payment). The user and the AP agent follow the processes
below. We suppose h ¼ 37 is a public number.
6.1.4 Anonymity Scalability
The user reencrypts the coin c, chooses  ¼ 4, and computes
c0 ¼ ða0 ¼ ga; b0 ¼ Y bÞ ¼ ð24; 16Þ ðmodule47Þ and signs a
Schnorr signature S on m ¼ h ¼ 36 ðmodule47Þ. Finally,
the user sends ðc; c0; S;mÞ to the AP agent. The latter verifies
the Schnorr signature S and (1) and sends a certificate Certc0
to the user if they are correct.
Since the new coin c0 ¼ ð24; 16Þ and its certificate Certc0
have no relationship with the bank, the user has high
anonymity.
6.1.5 Payment
The user signs a signature S ¼ ðe; u; v; t1Þ of a message m
which includes c0; Certc0 and purchase time, etc., to prove
the ownership of the new coin. For convenience, we assume
m ¼ 11. The user chooses k ¼ 5, then computes
t ¼ Y kgs ¼ 1 ðmodule47Þ;
e ¼ Hðm; tÞ ¼ 20 ðmodule47Þ;
u ¼ 11 ðmodule23Þ;
v ¼ 1 ðmodule23Þ;
t1 ¼ 34 ðmodule47Þ:
The shop who is convinced that the user is the owner of
the coin computes t0 ¼ 34 ðmodule47Þ if the equation of t0 ¼
tt1 and the signature S is successful. He/she does not know
who the user is.
6.1.6 Deposit
The bank puts the money into the shop’s account when the
checking of the coin C0 ¼ ð24; 16Þ and the signature S ¼
ðe; u; v; t1Þ ¼ ð20; 11; 1; 34Þ are correct. The shop can also see
that the money in his account is added.
When the user uses the old coin ð9; 24Þ again, then
another signature S1 ¼ ðe1; u1; v1; t12Þ is produced. Suppose
m ¼ 3 and k ¼ 1, we have e1 ¼ 30 and v1 ¼ 0. Therefore,
ðv1  vÞ=ðe e1Þ ¼ 7 ¼ xuðmod 23Þ. It means no double
spending of the old coin and the new coin.
6.2 Purchase Procedures
6.2.1 Purchase Procedure 1
In purchase procedure 1, a consumer decides how much
money should be paid to the shop, withdraws the money
from the bank, and pays it to the shop.
1. Consumer to shop: The consumer wants to buy some
goods in a shop, so he/she contacts the shop for the
price.
2. Consumer to bank: The consumer gets the money from
the bank, the amount being embedded in the
signature.
3. Anonymity scalability: If the consumer wants to
maintain a high level of anonymity, he/she can ask
the AP agent to certify a new coin which can be then
used in the shop.
4. Consumer to shop: The consumer proves to the shop
that he/she is the owner of the money and pays it to
the shop. Then, the shop sends the goods to the
consumer.
5. Shop to bank: The shop deposits the e-cash in the
bank. The bank checks the validation and that there
is no double spending of the coin. The bank transfers
the money to the shop’s account.
6.2.2 Purchase Procedure 2
In purchase procedure 2, the consumer does not have to
ask the bank to send money since the consumer already
has enough e-cash in his “wallet.” All the consumer needs
to do is to get some smaller e-cash from the AP agent to
pay the shop.
There are four steps in purchase procedure 2. They are:
1) consumer to shop, 2) consumer to AP agent, 3) consumer to
shop again, and (4) shop to bank. Step 2, consumer to AP agent,
is different from Step 3 in procedure 1, but the other three
steps are similar to those in procedure 1. Therefore, we
focus only on Step 2, consumer to AP agent. It should be
noted that electronic-cash is a digital message and a
certification. We say that the AP agent can provide
certificates of coins then provide a service in changing to
small coin.
Consumer to AP agent: The consumer advises the AP
agent of the amount of money to pay the shop from his
wallet. He/she then asks the AP agent to make some
smaller coins. By doing this, the consumer can also get a
high level of anonymity. After checking the old money sent
by the consumer, the AP agent creates some new coins of an
equivalent value to the original coin. One of these new coins
can be used in the shop.
We have already seen that the consumer can keep money
in his wallet or get money from the bank. In both purchase
procedures 1 and 2, most computations are done by the
consumers, so the system is very convenient for Internet
purchases.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new electronic cash scheme is described and
its RBAC management is analyzed. The new scheme
provides different degrees of anonymity for consumers.
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Consumers have a low level of anonymity if they want to
spend coins directly after withdrawing them from the bank.
They can achieve a high level of anonymity through the
AP agent without revealing their private information and
are more secure in relation to the bank because certification
comes from the AP agent, who is not involved in the
payment process. There is little research available on RBAC
for electronic cash schemes. We first canvas RBAC for
payment schemes in this paper. With RBAC, the conflicts of
different roles can be reduced and the complexities of the
scheme can be decreased. The duty separation constraints
of roles, role hierarchies, and scenarios of end-users are
discussed in details.
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